Abstract: By making use of the quasi-natural experiment of the officials as independent directors resigning in groups resulted from the issuing of“The Opinions on Further Solving the Issue of Party and Government Leading Cadres Holding Part-time or Full-time Positions in Enterprises”by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, this paper explores the impact and the action mechanism of the closing of the politics-business revolving door on the stock price crash risks. The findings show that in the non-state-owned listed companies, the resignation of officials as independent directors has significantly reduced the companies’ share price crash risks. The results of further analysis show that if the listed companies have higher reliance on external financing, worse legal environment of the location, more severe rent-seeking, and more government intervention, the stock price stabilizing effect after the resignation of officials as independent directors is more significant, which suggests that the closing of the politics-business revolving door can bring the financing constraints tightening effect, the regulation implementing strengthening effect, the rent seeking interruption effect, and the policy burden alleviating effect, all of these will effectively reduce the stock price crash risks. To standardize the rules and measures for the purification of the relationship between the government officials and the businessmen is helpful to stabilize the financial markets.

Key words: politics-business revolving door; stock price crash risk; No. 18 Document of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of CPC