Contemporary Finance & Economics ›› 2019, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 20-.

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Institutional Investors, Corporate Financing Constraints and Excess Cash Holding

HU Yuan-cheng, LU Ling   

  1. (Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China)
  • Received:2018-04-14 Published:2021-01-21

Abstract: Based on the data of A share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017, this paper explores the impact of institutional investors of different types on the financing constraints of listed enterprises and the excess cash holding. The results show that if there are institutional investors among the top ten shareholders of the listed company and the share holding proportion of one single institutional investor is relatively bigger, reaching more than 1% or more, then such institutional investor can have substantial effects on the operation, management and decision marking of the enterprise, which can to a certain extent solve the problems of information asymmetric and agency conflicts, release business financing constraints, and reduce the excess cash holding because of precautionary motive. If institutional investors are not among the top ten shareholders and holding a small amount of stocks, such institutional investors have little effect on corporate governance, and no significant influence is found on the corporate financing constraint and excess cash holding. When institutional investors hold large amount of stocks in a company for a long time, it is in favor of their participation in the corporate governance, so that the agency problem between shareholders and managers can be alleviated.

Key words: institutional investors; financing constraint; corporate governance; excess cash holding