Abstract: Based on the resource adjustment activities of enterprises, this paper employs the binding theory to analyze the impact of cross-listing on the cost stickiness of Chinese enterprises. The empirical results show that cross-listing has significantly reduced the cost stickiness. It indicates that cross-listing can put Chinese enterprises in better market environment, information environment and supervised environment, and the self-serving behavior of the management can be effectively restricted. It is also found that, compared with companies with higher equity balance degree, the companies with lower equity balance degree can have a larger scope of reduced cost stickiness when cross-listed. Compared with the companies with non-conspired equity restriction, the companies with conspired equity restriction will have a larger scope of reduced cost stickiness when cross-listed. This indicates that, as the internal mechanism of the enterprises to supervise and restrict the management, equity restriction can affect the governance effect produced by the binding effect.

Key words: cross-listing; cost stickiness; equity restriction