Abstract: Taking China’s A-share listed companies between the years of 2001 to 2015 as samples, this paper studies the influence of staggered tenures of CEO and CFO on the collapse risks of stock prices. The findings show that the staggered tenure of CEO and CFO can inhibit stock price collapse risks; and the wider the gap of the staggered tenures of the two, the more significant the effect will be. Further analysis also shows that the power of CEO can impact the relationship between the staggered tenures of CEO and CFO and the collapse risks of stock prices. If the CEO has greater power, the staggered tenures of CEO and CFO will not inhibit stock price collapse risks; if the CEO’s power is smaller, the staggered tenure of CEO and CFO will significantly inhibit the collapse risks of stock prices. In addition, the characteristics of property right will affect the inhibiting effect of the staggered tenure of CEO and CFO on the collapse risk of stock prices. In state-owned enterprises, the staggered tenure of CEO and CFO can inhibit the stock price collapse risks significantly, while in the private enterprises, this effect is not significant.

Key words: CEO; CFO; staggered tenure; stock price collapse risk