Abstract: A scientific establishment of the president-CEO structure and how to reduce the cost of management agent have always been hot issues in the researches of the accounting theoretical cycle. This paper makes use of the sample data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 to investigate the influence of the changes of the two-position structure on the costs of direct agency and indirect agency of the management, and the regulation effect of the level of rule of law on the two relationships as well. The findings show that the decentralized changes in the two-position structure can significantly reduce the direct agency costs and the indirect agency costs of the management. While the centralized changes of the two-position structure can significantly increase the direct agency costs of the management, but no influence on the indirect agency costs of the management. The results of further analysis show that the influence of the decentralized changes of the president-CEO structure on the direct agency costs and indirect agency costs of management only works in the enterprises located in the areas with lower level of rule of law, i.e., the lower the level of rule of law, the greater the impact of the decentralized changes of the two-position structure on the two kinds of agency costs of the management will be. But the level of the rule of law does not affect the relationship between the centralized changes of the president-CEO structure and the two types of agency costs of management.

Key words: changes of the two-position structure; direct agent cost; indirect agency cost; level of the rule of law