Abstract: This paper makes use of the data of the closeness of managerial geographical relationship and investment efficiency from A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2013 to conduct an empirical test. The results indicate that the geographical relationship between the chairman of the board and the general manager in state-owned enterprises is closer than that in the non-state-owned ones; this is even so in local state-owned enterprises. If the enterprise is located in the same province where the chairman is born or growing up, the geographical relationship between the chairman and the general manager is much closer. The closer the geographical relationship between the chairman and the general manager is, the less investment efficiency of the enterprise will be. Compared with the private enterprises, the geographical relationship of the management in the state-owned enterprises has a more significant effect on the investment efficiency. Compared with local state-owned enterprises, the geographical relationship of the management in the enterprises owned by the central government has a more significant effect on the investment efficiency. And the geographical relationship of the management in the enterprises whose chairman is not in the same province has a more significant effect on the investment efficiency.

Key words: management geographical relationship; investment efficiency; nature of property right