Abstract: In the context of frequent occurrence of embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives in China’s enterprises, this paper applies the principal agent theory and the rent-seeking theory in the economics to view the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives as a moral hazard and power rent-seeking behavior. Out of opportunist motivation, senior executives may grab individual interests through such methods as hiding information, hiding behavior and power rent-seeking, thereby reducing the corporate value. Meanwhile, this paper makes a further analysis of the short-term, long-term and extreme influences of the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives upon corporate value from the three levels of market response, long-term value expression and financial distress. This study believes that the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives would lead to serious adverse market reactions, which would reduce the long-term corporate value and make the corporate fall into financial distress.

Key words: job-related embezzlement crime by senior executives; corporate value; principal-agent theory; rent-seeking theory