Abstract: In order to solve the problem of boundary dilemma in the strategic alliance, this paper firstly examines the impact of the control mechanism in the strategic alliance on the coordinative efficiency and speculative risks of the alliance, and then it tests the different impacts of coordinative efficiency and speculative risks on the performances of the alliance members. The empirical results indicate that the formal contract control can efficiently resolve the problem of speculative risks in the boundary dilemma, so as to improve the performances of the alliance members; whereas the informal social control including relation control and information control can efficiently solve the problem of coordinative efficiency in the boundary dilemma, so as to improve the performance of the alliance members. These findings can enrich and extend the present literatures in strategic alliance management and provide significant empirical evidences and theoretical supports to the strategic alliance members to resolve boundary dilemma and further enhance alliance cooperative performance.

Key words: strategic alliance; control mechanism; boundary dilemma; contract control