Abstract: The formal researches hold that when there is financial leverage in a company, the purpose of lowering the executive pay-performance sensitivity by the shareholders is to restrict the risk transfer motivation of the executives and reduce the debt agent costs. We believe that the purpose of this kind of reducing executive pay-performance sensitivity is more likely that the shareholders are taking advantages of the creditors who are bearing the costs of the suboptimum behaviors of the executives when the corporate performance is worse. Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies during 2007-2012, it can be found that the executive pay-performance sensitivity is negatively correlated with the level of liabilities, while the stickiness of the executive compensation is positively related to the level of liabilities, which suggest that our view is well supported. It is further found that when shareholders are taking advantages of the creditors to bear the costs of the suboptimum behaviors of the executives, they are encouraging executives to transfer risks, thus further expropriate the wealth of the creditors.

Key words: debt financing; pay-performance sensitivity; stickiness of compensation; pillage