征管技术与企业税收操纵：来自增值税进销比的证据

当代财经 ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (9): 43-55.

征管技术与企业税收操纵：来自增值税进销比的证据

张文文¹, 董淑婷², 韩艳³

1.湖北经济学院工商管理学院,湖北武汉 430205;
2.中南财经政法大学税收治理研究中心,湖北武汉 430073;
3.中国资产评估协会,北京 100045

收稿日期:2026-01-04 修回日期:2026-07-31 出版日期:2026-09-15 发布日期:2026-09-14
通讯作者: 张文文（1988—）,女,湖北荆州人,湖北经济学院讲师,管理学博士,主要从事财税理论研究,联系方式zhangww@hbue.edu.cn。
作者简介:董淑婷（2001—）,女,湖北宜昌人,中南财经政法大学助理研究员,主要从事税收理论与政策研究;韩艳（1983—）,女,北京人,中国资产评估协会高级经济师,经济学博士,主要从事资产评估研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国税收优惠落地的逻辑机理与政策优化研究”（72473157）

Technology of Tax Enforcement and Tax Manipulation: Evidence from the VAT Input-Output Tax Ratio

Zhang Wenwen¹, Dong Shuting², Han Yan³

1. Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan 430205;
2. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073;
3. China Appraisal Society, Beijing 100045

Received:2026-01-04 Revised:2026-07-31 Online:2026-09-15 Published:2026-09-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 税收征管技术升级如何影响企业增值税申报行为,是理解数字化征管治理效应的重要问题。从增值税进销比视角识别企业的税收操纵行为,基于金税三期工程分批上线这一准自然实验和2011—2019年全国企业税收调查数据的实证研究表明,在金税三期工程实施后,靠近零税负点左侧、具有较高税收操纵嫌疑的企业数量显著减少;从企业申报行为看,征管信息技术升级使这类企业的增值税进销比平均下降约1.5%。这表明企业通过调节进销项申报以维持低税负状态的空间受到压缩,纳税遵从程度明显提升。此外,这种治理效应在税收操纵动机较强的企业中更为突出,主要表现为中小企业、非国有企业以及事前留抵比例较高的企业的进销比下降幅度更大。最后,拓展性分析显示,征管技术升级对企业增值税操纵行为的约束主要体现在进项端,应抵扣税额显著下降,而销项端变化不显著。这说明金税三期工程主要通过强化异常抵扣识别和上下游匹配核验来压缩企业的操纵空间。上述结论为理解数字化征管改革如何改变企业纳税申报行为提供了新的微观证据,也为“以数治税”背景下推进精准监管和优化税收治理提供了经验支持。

关键词: 税收征管, 金税三期工程, 税收操纵, 增值税

Abstract: How upgrades in the technology of tax enforcement affect corporate VAT declaration behavior is a key question for understanding the governance effects of digital tax enforcement. Employing the phased rollout of Golden Tax III as a quasi-natural experiment, and using data from the National Tax Survey of Enterprises from 2011 to 2019, this paper identifies corporate tax manipulation from the perspective of the VAT input-output tax ratio. The empirical results show that: First, after the implementation of Golden Tax III, the number of firms located to the left of the zero-tax-burden point and suspected of relatively high levels of tax manipulation decreased significantly. Second, from the perspective of firms’ declaration behavior, the upgrade in information technology for tax enforcement reduced the VAT input-output tax ratio of such firms by approximately 1.5% on average, indicating that the room for firms to maintain low tax burdens by adjusting input and output declarations has been compressed, and tax compliance has markedly improved. Third, this governance effect is more pronounced among firms with stronger incentives for tax manipulation, mainly reflected in larger reductions in the input-output ratio for small and medium-sized enterprises, non-state-owned firms, and those with higher pre-existing VAT credit balances. Fourth, further analysis shows that the constraining effect of the tax-enforcement technology upgrade on VAT manipulation is primarily exerted on the input side, with deductible input VAT declining significantly, while no significant change is observed on the output side. This suggests that Golden Tax III mainly compresses firms’ room for manipulation by strengthening the identification of abnormal credits and the verification of upstream-downstream matching. These findings provide new micro-level evidence for understanding how digital tax enforcement reforms reshape corporate tax declaration behavior, and offer empirical support for advancing precision-based regulation and optimizing tax governance in the context of data-driven tax governance.

Key words: tax enforcement, Golden Tax Project III, tax manipulation, VAT

中图分类号:

F812.42

张文文, 董淑婷, 韩艳. 征管技术与企业税收操纵：来自增值税进销比的证据[J]. 当代财经, 2026, 0(9): 43-55.

Zhang Wenwen, Dong Shuting, Han Yan. Technology of Tax Enforcement and Tax Manipulation: Evidence from the VAT Input-Output Tax Ratio[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2026, 0(9): 43-55.

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