地方融资平台整合重组、隐性担保预期与违约风险

当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (2): 57-70.

地方融资平台整合重组、隐性担保预期与违约风险

王秋石¹, 万睿¹, 范文诚¹, 魏志华²

1.江西财经大学经济学院,江西南昌 330013;
2.厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门 361005

收稿日期:2023-02-26 修回日期:2023-09-20 发布日期:2024-01-23
通讯作者: 万睿,江西财经大学博士研究生,主要从事宏观经济与制度经济研究,联系方式wr_6677@163.com。
作者简介:王秋石,江西财经大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事宏观经济与制度经济研究;范文诚,江西财经大学博士研究生,主要从事发展经济学研究;魏志华,厦门大学教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事公司财务、资本市场与财税问题研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“发展中大国去工业化经济风险的形成机理及预警防控研究”（22AJL015）; 江西省研究生创新专项资金项目“地方融资平台转型视角下政府隐性担保对平台公司信用风险影响研究”（YC2022-B138）

Integration and Restructuring of Local Financing Platforms, Implicit Guarantee Expectations and Default Risks

WANG Qiu-shi¹, WAN Rui¹, FAN Wen-cheng¹, WEI Zhi-hua²

1. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013;
2. Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China

Received:2023-02-26 Revised:2023-09-20 Published:2024-01-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来地方融资平台“野蛮”式发展,大量举债导致政府隐性债务规模增长,地方融资平台违约风险急剧上升。作为地方政府基础设施建设的主要融资力量,地方融资平台转型成为化解隐性债务风险的重要途径。基于综合信用风险和无限期离散递归模型,以及2017—2021年地方融资平台数据的研究表明,地方融资平台整合重组能够借助隐性担保预期降低违约风险。在隐性担保预期的调节作用下,地方融资平台整合重组主要通过信用效应、运营效应和利率效应降低违约风险。异质性分析发现,该影响在规模较小、盈利能力较弱的企业和经济发展较弱的地区中更为显著。拓展分析发现,整合为集团企业既可以降低地方融资平台违约风险,又可以随着集团市场化的发展一步步削弱对隐性担保预期的依赖,是一种双赢的选择。上述结论意味着,融资平台整合重组有助于降低地方融资平台违约风险、进一步化解政府隐性债务风险。

关键词: 地方融资平台, 整合重组, 隐性担保预期, 违约风险

Abstract: In recent years, local government financing platforms have undergone a“reckless”style of development, resulting in a substantial increase in government implicit debt due to extensive borrowing, and a sharp rise in the default risks of local government financing platforms as well. As the primary financing force for local government infrastructure projects, the transformation of local financing platforms has become a crucial approach to mitigating implicit debt risks. Based on a comprehensive credit risk model and an indefinite discrete recursive model, as well as the data from local financing platforms between 2017 and 2021, this paper conducts a study. The findings show that theintegration and restructuring of local financing platforms can leverage implicit guarantee expectations to subsequently reduce default risks. Under the moderating effect of implicit guarantee expectations, the integration and restructuring of local financing platforms can reduce default risks primarily through credit effects, operational effects, and interest rate effects. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that this impact is more significant among enterprises with smaller scales, weaker profitability, and regions with less developed economies. The extended analysis reveals that the integration for conglomerate enterprises can not only reduce the default risks of local financing platforms but alsoprogressively diminish the dependence on the implicit guarantee expectations as the conglomerate’s marketization develops. This constitutes a win-win choice. The above conclusion suggests that the integration and restructure of the local financing platforms can effectively reduce their default risks and further address the issues of hidden government debt.

Key words: local financing platform, integration and restructuring, implicit guarantee expectations, default risks

中图分类号:

F812.5

王秋石, 万睿, 范文诚, 魏志华. 地方融资平台整合重组、隐性担保预期与违约风险[J]. 当代财经, 2024, 0(2): 57-70.

WANG Qiu-shi, WAN Rui, FAN Wen-cheng, WEI Zhi-hua. Integration and Restructuring of Local Financing Platforms, Implicit Guarantee Expectations and Default Risks[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2024, 0(2): 57-70.

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