跨国公司高管攫取了更多的私有收益吗——基于高管超额职务消费的视角

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 国际化经营是企业利用全球生产要素和国内国外两个市场的重要方式。那么,相对于没有开展国际化经营的企业,开展国际化经营的中国跨国公司会加剧高管的超额职务消费吗?以2007—2021年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,从高管超额职务消费的视角探讨了跨国公司高管私有收益攫取行为。研究发现,企业国际化经营程度越高,高管超额职务消费也越高;经营风险高和财务风险低会强化企业国际化经营与高管超额职务消费之间的正相关关系。机制检验发现,企业国际化经营引发的企业产品市场风险、高管的超额现金持有行为与海外并购行为,分别是高管进行超额职务消费的压力、机会与借口。进一步检验发现,跨国公司高管超额职务消费会对企业的全要素生产率产生不利影响。异质性检验发现,信息披露质量高以及机构投资者持股比例高会显著抑制跨国公司高管的超额职务消费行为。

关键词: 跨国公司, 国际化经营, 高管私有收益, 超额职务消费, 全要素生产率

Abstract: International operation is an important way for Chinese enterprises to use global production factors and domestic and foreign markets. So, compared with the enterprises that do not carry out international operations, will the international operations of Chinese transnational enterprises aggravate their executives’ excess consumptions related to their positions? Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research objects, this paper discusses the private profits grabbing behavior of the executives of multinational corporations from the perspective of their excess position-related consumptions. The findings show that the higher the degree of international operation of the corporates, the higher the degree of excess consumptions related to positions of executives. The higher operational risks and the lower financial risks will strengthen the positive correlation between the international operations of corporations and the excessive position-related consumption behaviors of executives. The result of the mechanism test reveals that the corporate product market risks, excess cash holding behaviors of executives and overseas M&A behaviors caused by corporate international operations respectively constitute the pressure, opportunities and excuses for the occurrence of executives’ excess position-related consumptions. The result of further test reveals that executives’ excess position-related consumptions in multinational corporations will exert an adverse impact on the total factor productivity of the enterprises. The heterogeneity tests find that when the quality of information disclosure is high and the proportion of institutional investors is high, executives’ excess position-related consumption behaviors in multinational corporations can be significantly suppressed.

Key words: multinational corporations, international operation, executive private profits, excessive position-related consumption, total factor productivity

中图分类号:

F275.3

朱杰. 跨国公司高管攫取了更多的私有收益吗——基于高管超额职务消费的视角[J]. 当代财经, 2022, 0(12): 124-136.

ZHU Jie. Do Executives of Multinational Corporations Grab More Private Profits: From the Perspective of Executives’ Excess Position-Related Consumption[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(12): 124-136.

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