证券交易所一线监管与公司CFO离职——基于财务报告问询函的视角

当代财经 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (4): 88-99.

证券交易所一线监管与公司CFO离职——基于财务报告问询函的视角

唐雪松, 王琬婷, 李闻

西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都 611130

收稿日期:2021-06-08 修回日期:2022-02-19 出版日期:2022-04-15 发布日期:2022-05-26
通讯作者: 李闻,西南财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理、审计理论等研究,联系方式santulnu@163.com
作者简介:唐雪松,西南财经大学教授,博士,主要从事会计与审计理论、公司治理等研究;王琬婷,西南财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理、信息披露等研究
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目“独立董事,高管腐败与外部环境”（71672152）; 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“监管制度变迁与CFO能力演进——基于‘新三板'的理论与实证研究”（JBK19072018155）

Frontline Regulation of Stock Exchanges and CFO Turnover: From the Perspective of Financial Report Inquiry Letters

TANG Xue-song, WANG Wan-ting, LI Wen

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China

Received:2021-06-08 Revised:2022-02-19 Online:2022-04-15 Published:2022-05-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以上市公司收到交易所财务报告问询函为研究对象,利用2015—2019年沪深A股上市公司的样本,研究交易所财务报告问询函对公司CFO离职的影响。结果表明,财务报告问询显著提高了CFO离职的概率,且针对前一年年报或当年季报/半年报的收函总数越多,CFO离职概率越高。异质性分析发现,在公司信息披露质量差、外部制度环境好的情况下,财务报告问询对CFO离职的影响更显著。进一步分析发现,财务报告问询主要提高了执行能力较弱CFO的离职概率,CFO离职后公司股价崩盘风险显著降低;同时,当继任CFO执行能力较强时,股价崩盘风险会显著下降。上述结果表明,财务报告问询制度能够发挥信息和监管效应,通过高管人员CFO的变更,提高公司信息披露质量,促进资本市场健康发展。

关键词: 问询函, CFO离职, 信息披露, 股价崩盘

Abstract: Taking the financial report inquiry letters of stock exchanges received by listed companies as research objects, this paper makes use of the samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2019 to study the impact of financial report inquiry letters of stock exchanges on CFO turnover. The findings show that the financial report inquiry letters have significantly increased the probability of CFO turnover. And the more the number of letters received concerning the previous year's annual report or the quarterly/semi-annual reports of the same year, the higher the probability of CFOs' leave. It is found through the heterogeneity analysis that in the context of poor quality of corporate information disclosure and good external institutional environment, the impact of financial report inquiry letters on CFO turnover will be more significant. Further analysis shows that the financial report inquiry letters mainly increase the turnover of CFOs with lower executive ability, and the risks of stock price crash is significantly reduced after these CFOs leaving office; meanwhile, when the executive ability of the successor CFO is stronger, the risks of stock price crash will also be significantly reduced. The above-mentioned results show that the financial report inquiry letters can play an informative and regulatory role, improve the quality of corporate information disclosure and promote the healthy development of the capital market through CFOs turnover.

Key words: inquiry letter, CFO turnover, information disclosure, stock price crash

中图分类号:

F832.5

唐雪松, 王琬婷, 李闻. 证券交易所一线监管与公司CFO离职——基于财务报告问询函的视角[J]. 当代财经, 2022, 0(4): 88-99.

TANG Xue-song, WANG Wan-ting, LI Wen. Frontline Regulation of Stock Exchanges and CFO Turnover: From the Perspective of Financial Report Inquiry Letters[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(4): 88-99.

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