非处罚性监管能约束管理层语调操纵吗——基于年报文本的经验证据

当代财经 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3): 89-101.

非处罚性监管能约束管理层语调操纵吗——基于年报文本的经验证据

付文博¹, 曾皓²

1.首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京 100070;
2.江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌 330013

收稿日期:2021-06-10 出版日期:2022-03-15 发布日期:2022-03-31
通讯作者: 曾皓,江西财经大学讲师,博士,主要从事公司财务研究,联系方式1202000041@jxufe.edu.cn。
作者简介:付文博,首都经济贸易大学博士研究生,主要从事社会网络与公司治理研究;
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“经济高质量发展下‘脱僵企业'返僵风险动态预警及‘阻返'机制研究”（21YJC630003）; 江西省教育厅科技项目“基于机器学习的企业僵尸化困境多阶段动态预警研究：理论、实证与应用”（GJJ200529）

Can Non-Punitive Supervision Restrain the Management's Tone Manipulation? Empirical Evidences Based on Annual Report Texts

FU Wen-bo¹, ZENG Hao²

1. Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
2. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Received:2021-06-10 Online:2022-03-15 Published:2022-03-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 证券交易所问询函监管对非财务文本信息的治理效应较少受到研究关注。利用2015—2019年沪深A股非金融类上市公司数据,实证检验交易所财务报告问询函监管对管理层语调操纵的影响及其作用机制。结果表明,财务报告问询函能够有效地抑制管理层语调操纵,且企业收函数量越多,抑制作用越明显。区分问询函特征的结果表明,当问询函内容涉及的问题数量越多、风险事项越多、公司连续收函、会计师事务所被“点名”时,对管理层语调操纵的抑制作用更强。机制检验结果表明,财务报告问询函主要通过“管制补充效应”和“市场压力效应”对管理层语调操纵进行约束。进一步研究发现,财务报告问询函对管理层语调操纵的影响会向审计关联企业正向溢出,而向董事关联企业负向溢出。

关键词: 财务报告问询函, 管理层语调操纵, 文本分析, 溢出效应

Abstract: The governance effect of inquiry letter supervision in stock exchanges on non-financial textual information has aroused little research focus. By making use of the data of China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this paper empirically tests the impact of the supervision of the financial report inquiry letters in the stock exchanges on the management's tone manipulation and its mechanism. The results show that the financial report inquiry letters can effectively restrain the management's tone manipulation, and the more the letters received by the company, the more significant the impact will be. When the characteristics of the inquiry letters are distinguished, the results show that the more the number of questions involved in the inquiry letters, the more the risky matters, the more continuous receipt of letters, and the more names of the accounting firms being called, the more significant the restraint on the management's tone manipulation will be. The results of a mechanism test show that the financial report inquiry letters can restrict the management's tone manipulation mainly through the“regulatory supplementary effect”and the“market pressure effect”. Further research reveals that the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters on the management's tone manipulation will spill over to the auditing-related enterprises positively and to the director-related enterprises negatively.

Key words: financial report inquiry letter, management's tone manipulation, text analysis, spillover effect

中图分类号:

F276.6

付文博, 曾皓. 非处罚性监管能约束管理层语调操纵吗——基于年报文本的经验证据[J]. 当代财经, 2022, 0(3): 89-101.

FU Wen-bo, ZENG Hao. Can Non-Punitive Supervision Restrain the Management's Tone Manipulation? Empirical Evidences Based on Annual Report Texts[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(3): 89-101.

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