地方债务治理对银行信贷资金“脱虚向实”的影响——基于国务院“43号文”准自然实验的经验考察

当代财经 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (2): 63-74.

地方债务治理对银行信贷资金“脱虚向实”的影响——基于国务院“43号文”准自然实验的经验考察

梁虎¹, 张珩²

1.武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉 430072;
2.同济大学经济与管理学院,上海 200092

收稿日期:2020-08-18 修回日期:2021-01-06 出版日期:2021-02-15 发布日期:2021-03-16
通讯作者: 梁虎,武汉大学博士研究生,主要从事商业银行业务经营与管理研究,联系方式lianghu_js@sina.com。
作者简介:张珩,同济大学博士后研究人员,管理学博士,主要从事金融理论与政策研究。
基金资助:
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“经济发展新常态下我国货币政策体系建设研究”（15JZD013）; 国家自然科学基金青年项目“法人治理、产权改革对农村信用社双重绩效的影响：机理研究与实证检验”（71903151）

The Impact of Local Government Debt Governance on Bank Credit Funds“Shifting from Fictitious Assets to Real Assets”: An Empirical Investigation into the Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on the State Council’s No. 43 Document

LIANG Hu¹, ZHANG Heng²

1. Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072;
2. Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China

Received:2020-08-18 Revised:2021-01-06 Online:2021-02-15 Published:2021-03-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 国务院“43号文”的实施,为研究地方债务的治理效果提供了一个准自然实验场景。研究发现：地方债务治理对银行金融资产没有产生影响,但会显著增加银行总贷款、个人贷款和企业贷款,有助于银行信贷资金的“脱虚向实”;地方债务治理能显著增加银行实体行业贷款,但不能显著增加银行非实体行业贷款和建筑业贷款。机制检验发现,地方债务治理可以通过降低借款人和借款企业的融资成本,间接性地影响银行信贷资金配置。进一步研究发现,国务院“43号文”实施后,资产质量高的银行倾向于增加企业贷款和实体行业贷款,资产质量低的银行倾向于增加个人贷款;银行规模可以强化地方债务治理对银行贷款增长的促进作用。因此,为促进银行信贷资金的“脱虚向实”,应提高地方债务治理水平,强化对银行业务的监管与引导,加强风险管理,保障银行资产质量。

关键词: 债务治理, 银行信贷, 贷款利率, 双重差分

Abstract: The implementation of No.43 Document of the State Council has provided a quasi-natural experimental scenario for the researches on the governance effect of local debts. The findings show that local debt governance has no significant impact on banks’ financial assets, but it has increased total bank loans, personal loans and corporate loans, which is conductive to the“shifting from fictitious assets to real assets”of bank credit funds. Local debt governance can significantly increase bank loans to real industries, but not increase bank loans to the non-real industries or the construction industry. The findings of a mechanism test indicate that local debt governance can indirectly affect the allocation of bank credit funds by reducing personal and corporate financing costs. The result of further research shows that after the implementation of No.43 Document, banks with higher asset quality are inclined to provide more loans to enterprises and the real industries, and banks with lower asset quality are inclined to provide more personal loans. The bank size can strengthen the role of local debt governance in promoting bank loan growth. Therefore, in order to facilitate bank credit funds “shifting from fictitious assets to real assets”, it is necessary to improve the level of local debt management, strengthen the supervision and guidance of banking business, and enhance risk management, so as to ensure the quality of bank assets.

Key words: debt governance, bank credit, interest rates, DID

中图分类号:

F832.4

梁虎, 张珩. 地方债务治理对银行信贷资金“脱虚向实”的影响——基于国务院“43号文”准自然实验的经验考察[J]. 当代财经, 2021, 0(2): 63-74.

LIANG Hu, ZHANG Heng. The Impact of Local Government Debt Governance on Bank Credit Funds“Shifting from Fictitious Assets to Real Assets”: An Empirical Investigation into the Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on the State Council’s No. 43 Document[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(2): 63-74.

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