当代财经 ›› 2017, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 198-.

• • 上一篇    

高管超额薪酬影响了企业债务融资吗

黄送钦,吴利华,许从宝   

  1. (东南大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189)
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-16 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:黄送钦,东南大学博士研究生,主要从事制度环境与公司治理、银行治理研究,通讯作者联系方式sqhuang0704@163.com;吴利华,东南大学教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事制度环境与企业发展战略研究;许从宝,东南大学博士研究生,主要从事资本市场、公司金融研究。

Has Executive Excess Compensation Affected Corporate Debt Financing

HUANG Song-qin, WU Li-hua, XU Cong-bao   

  1. (Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China)
  • Received:2017-05-16 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 系统考察了高管超额薪酬这一争议因素对企业债务融资的影响及其作用机理,以及外部制度环境、内部治理机制等因素在两者间关系中所具有的治理性调节效应。研究发现,在国有控股企业中,高管超额薪酬与企业债务融资水平显著负相关,超额薪酬的作用机理是:因内部人控制问题的存在,国有控股企业高管存在薪酬操纵现象,其攫取的超额薪酬与企业业绩间存在无激励联动的“倒挂”关系,但企业债务所发挥的治理效应却显著增强了高管薪酬与业绩间敏感性,提高了高管薪酬操纵的难度。这表明在国有控股企业中两者间关系符合薪酬防御假说,即超额薪酬越高的高管往往会采取削减债务融资、增加商业信用的融资策略,为其谋取超额薪酬进行正当性防御;但没有证据表明在非国有控股企业中存在上述现象。进一步研究还发现,发展外部正式制度(市场化程度)、非正式制度(信任环境)环境以及增强董事会独立性、提高管理层持股比例的内部治理机制可以有效抑制超额薪酬高管对国有控股企业债务融资决策的非理性干预。

关键词: 超额薪酬,债务融资,薪酬操纵

Abstract: This paper systematically investigates the influence of the disputed factor, i.e., the issue of executive excess compensation, on corporate debt financing and its action mechanism, as well as the moderating effect of such factors as external institutional environment and internal governance mechanism on the relationship between the two. The findings show that in the state-owned holding enterprises the excess executive compensation is negatively correlated with the level of corporate debt financing significantly. The action mechanism of excess compensation is that due to the existence of internal control problem, there are salary manipulation phenomena by the executives in state-owned enterprises. There is non-incentive-linked upside-down relationship between the excess compensation grabbed and corporate performance, but the governance effect played by corporate debt has significantly enhanced the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance, and improved the difficulty of manipulating salaries by executives. This indicates that the relationship between the two matches the salary-defense hypothesis in state holding enterprises, namely, the executives with higher excess compensation tend to accept the financing strategy of reducing debt financing while increasing commercial credit, so as to carry out legitimacy defense for their seeking excess compensations. But there is no evidence showing that such a phenomenon exists in non state-owned holding enterprises. Further study also finds that some measures can effectively inhibit the irrational intervention of executives with excess compensation on debt financing decisions in state-owned holding enterprises, including the development of the external formal institution (degree of marketization) and the informal institution (trust environment) environment, the enhancement of the independence of the board of directors, and the improvement of the internal governance mechanism concerning the shareholding ratio of the management.

Key words: excess compensation; debt financing; salary manipulation