当代财经 ›› 2018, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 158-.

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交叉上市、股权制衡与企业成本粘性

吴思1,陈震2   

  1. (1. 浙江大学 管理学院,浙江 杭州 310058;2. 中南财经政法大学 会计学院,湖北 武汉 430073)
  • 收稿日期:2017-09-07 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:吴 思,浙江大学博士研究生,主要从事公司财务与公司治理研究,通讯作者联系方式11520024@zju.edu.cn;陈 震,中南财经政法大学教授,主要从事高管薪酬激励研究。

Cross-Listing, Equity Restriction and Enterprise Cost Stickiness

WU Si1, CHEN Zhen2   

  1. (1. Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058; 2. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China)
  • Received:2017-09-07 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 基于企业的资源调整行为,利用绑定理论,分析了交叉上市对企业成本粘性的影响。实证结果表明,交叉上市能显著降低企业的成本粘性。这说明交叉上市能使企业处于更好的市场环境、信息环境与监管环境,能够有效约束管理层的自利行为。研究还发现,与股权制衡度较高的公司相比,股权制衡度较低的公司交叉上市成本粘性降低的幅度更大;与存在非合谋型股权制衡的公司相比,存在合谋型股权制衡的公司交叉上市成本粘性降低的幅度更大。这说明股权制衡作为企业对管理层监督约束的内部机制,会影响绑定效应产生的治理效果。

关键词: 交叉上市,成本粘性,股权制衡

Abstract: Based on the resource adjustment activities of enterprises, this paper employs the binding theory to analyze the impact of cross-listing on the cost stickiness of Chinese enterprises. The empirical results show that cross-listing has significantly reduced the cost stickiness. It indicates that cross-listing can put Chinese enterprises in better market environment, information environment and supervised environment, and the self-serving behavior of the management can be effectively restricted. It is also found that, compared with companies with higher equity balance degree, the companies with lower equity balance degree can have a larger scope of reduced cost stickiness when cross-listed. Compared with the companies with non-conspired equity restriction, the companies with conspired equity restriction will have a larger scope of reduced cost stickiness when cross-listed. This indicates that, as the internal mechanism of the enterprises to supervise and restrict the management, equity restriction can affect the governance effect produced by the binding effect.

Key words: cross-listing; cost stickiness; equity restriction