当代财经 ›› 2015, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 610-.

• • 上一篇    

政治影响力、财政分权与地方政府公务员规模

陈志广   

  1. (南京大学 政府管理学院,江苏 南京 210023)
  • 收稿日期:2014-11-10 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:陈志广,南京大学副教授,博士,主要从事政府规制、公共财政与预算管理研究,联系方式chenzhiguang@nju.edu.cn。

Political Influence, Fiscal Decentralization and Civil Servants Scale of Local Governments

CHEN Zhi-guang   

  1. (Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, China)
  • Received:2014-11-10 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 中国地方政府的公务员规模受到政府间政治关系和财政关系的显著影响。地方相对于中央的政治影响力由关联中央委员的政治影响力加总而来,它对“官民比”指示的公务员规模发挥正向作用。地方相对于中央的财政分权,测度指标包括收入分权、支出分权和财政依赖,亦均对公务员规模发挥正向作用。因此,控制和优化地方政府公务员规模,可行的策略包括优化各种权责利配置、加强和改进党的领导、完善地方自主制度建设和推进政务信息公开工作。

关键词: 财政分权,公务员规模,政治影响力,财政依赖

Abstract: The intergovernmental political relations and the fiscal relations have significant impacts on the civil servants scale of China’s local governments. Compared to the political influence of the central government which is the total political influence related to the members of the Central Committee, the local governments can play a positive role in the civil servants scale indicated by the “ratio between officials and people”. Compared with the fiscal decentralization of the central government, the measuring indicators of local governments, including revenue decentralization, expenditure decentralization and fiscal dependence, also play a positive role in the expansion of civil servants scale. Therefore, the feasible strategies to be used to control and optimize the civil servants scale of local governments include optimizing and balancing all kinds of power, responsibility and interest, strengthening and improving Party’s leadership, improving the construction of local autonomy system, and promoting the work of government information disclosure.

Key words: fiscal decentralization; civil servants scale; political influence; fiscal dependence