当代财经 ›› 2015, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (03): 597-.

• • 上一篇    

中国式财政分权:一个扩展的分析框架

马万里   

  1. (山东大学(威海) 商学院,山东 威海 264209)
  • 收稿日期:2014-10-05 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:马万里,山东大学(威海)讲师,山东大学(威海)法学院法学博士后,主要从事财政理论与政策研究,联系方式mawanli2010sdu@163.com。

Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization: An Extended Interpretation Framework

MA Wan-li   

  1. (Shandong University, Weihai 264209, China)
  • Received:2014-10-05 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 中国式财政分权是影响经济社会发展的重要制度安排,是实现经济社会持续健康发展与国家长治久安的体制保障。中国式财政分权属于“行政性一致同意”型分权模式,是中央政府主导的自上而下的强制性制度变迁。因此,来自顶层的政治与财政激励以及官员自身的私人激励使地方政府具有发展经济的强劲动力,而“用手投票”与“用脚投票”缺失、法治基础薄弱、标尺竞争压力导致地方政府行为变异,对经济社会发展产生了诸多不利影响。未来的改革应从官员治理、制度设计、人民主权和监督机制四个方面着手,为经济社会持续健康发展与国家长治久安保驾护航。

关键词: 中国式财政分权,财政分权激励,增长型激励,地方行为变异

Abstract: Chinese-style fiscal decentralization is an important institutional arrangement which affects the economic and social development, as well as an institutional guarantee to achieve sustained healthy economic and social development and long-term peace and stability of the state. Chinese-style fiscal decentralization belongs to a model of unanimously executive-agreed decentralization, and it is a top-down mandatory institutional change led by the central government. Therefore, the political and financial incentives from the top as well as the private incentives from the government officials themselves enable the local governments to have a powerful drive to develop economy; while the missing of“hand voting”and“voting with feet”, the weakness of rule of law, and the yardstick competition pressure lead to behavior variation of local governments, which have generated a lot of adverse effects on economic and social development. The future reforms should set about from the following four aspects: the governance of government officials, the system design, the sovereignty of the people, and the supervise mechanisms, so as to guarantee the sustained economic and social development and stability of the state.

Key words: Chinese-style fiscal decentralization; financial decentralization incentives; growth-oriented incentives; local governments’ behavior variation