关键词: 央行沟通, 投资组合, 风险规避, 企业金融化

Abstract: With the continuous development of financial markets and financial derivatives, the problem of corporate financialization is becoming more and more serious. Most of the existing literatures only study the economic consequences brought by corporate financialization, only few study the causes and solutions of corporate financialization. On the theoretical basis of corporate “finance-material object”asset investment decision-making, this paper empirically examines the mechanism of central bank communication on enterprise financialization. It is found that the level of corporate financialization can be significantly reduced by loose words of central bank's communication, and its transmission mechanism lies in that the center bank's loose communication can inhibit the behavior of enterprise risk aversion, then further affect the level of corporate financialization. Furthermore, from the two perspectives of policy asymmetry and enterprise heterogeneity, it is found that the effect of central bank's communication is more significant during the periods of“action suiting to the words”and“austerity borough system”, while the enterprises with severe financing constraints are more sensitive to the changes of central bank's communication behavior. Therefore, the central bank can make a good boxing combination of expected management and other macro policies, guide the capital flowing from virtual economy to real economy, and promote the healthy development of the real economy.

Key words: central bank's communication, portfolio, risk-aversion, corporate financialization