国有企业董事长领薪安排与管理层薪酬激励——基于“委托-监督-代理”三层代理框架的研究

当代财经 ›› 2020, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 124-137.

国有企业董事长领薪安排与管理层薪酬激励——基于“委托-监督-代理”三层代理框架的研究

朱滔

暨南大学管理学院,广东广州 510632

收稿日期:2020-02-27 修回日期:2020-05-13 出版日期:2020-07-15 发布日期:2020-12-10
作者简介:朱滔,暨南大学教授,博士,主要从事公司财务与会计研究,联系方式zhutao@jnu.edu.cn。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“三层委托代理框架下的董事与经理层合谋问题研究：机制与治理”（71672076）

Salary Arrangement of Chairman of the Board and Salary Incentive for Top Management in State-Owned Enterprises: A Study Based on the Three-Tire Agency Framework

ZHU Tao

Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China

Received:2020-02-27 Revised:2020-05-13 Online:2020-07-15 Published:2020-12-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于“委托-监督-代理”的三层代理框架,根据国有企业普遍存在的董事长纵向双重任职现状,从董事长是否在上市公司领薪的视角,研究了国有企业董事长领薪安排对上市公司管理层薪酬激励的影响。研究发现：董事长在上市公司领薪能提高管理层薪酬-业绩敏感性,具有监督效应;董事长在上市公司领薪会增强管理层薪酬-公司规模敏感性,具有合谋效应;董事长在上市公司领薪显著降低了公司价值,合谋效应强于监督效应。进一步研究发现：监督效应会降低公司盈余管理,合谋效应会导致过度投资和过度负债。

关键词: 双重任职, 领薪安排, 合谋效应, 监督效应

Abstract: Based on the three-tire agency framework of“entrusting-supervising-agency”, and from the perspective of whether the chairman of the board receiving salary in the listed company, this paper studies the impact of salary arrangement of chairman of the board in state-owned enterprises on the salary incentive for the top management in listed companies based on the present situation of the chairman of the board of directors holding vertical dual positions that widely exists in the state-owned enterprises. The findings show that the chairman of the board receiving salary from the listed companies can enhance the salary-performance sensibility of the top management, having a supervising effect. The chairman of the board receiving salary from the listed companies will enhance the salary-company scale sensibility of the top management, having a collusion effect. The chairman of the board receiving compensation from the listed company will significantly lower the corporate value, the collusion effect is better than the supervision effect. The findings of further study show that the supervision effect will reduce the level of corporate earnings management, while the collusion effect will result in over-investment and over-debt.

Key words: dual appointment, compensation arrangement, collusion effect, supervision effect

中图分类号:

F275.4

朱滔. 国有企业董事长领薪安排与管理层薪酬激励——基于“委托-监督-代理”三层代理框架的研究[J]. 当代财经, 2020, 0(7): 124-137.

ZHU Tao. Salary Arrangement of Chairman of the Board and Salary Incentive for Top Management in State-Owned Enterprises: A Study Based on the Three-Tire Agency Framework[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2020, 0(7): 124-137.

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