中国大型机构投资者治理作用的甄别——基于盈余管理的视角

当代财经 ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (1): 114-126.

中国大型机构投资者治理作用的甄别——基于盈余管理的视角

吴晓晖¹, 杨静^1,2, 郭晓冬³

1.厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门 361005;
2.贵州师范大学经济与管理学院,贵州贵阳 550025 3.贵州财经大学会计学院,贵州贵阳 550025

收稿日期:2024-12-15 修回日期:2025-03-24 发布日期:2026-01-19
通讯作者: 郭晓冬,贵州财经大学副教授,管理学博士,主要从事机构投资者、公司金融与资本市场研究,联系方式guo517348019@163.com。
作者简介:吴晓晖,厦门大学教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,主要从事创业金融、机构投资者与资本市场研究;杨静,厦门大学博士研究生,贵州师范大学副教授,主要从事创业金融、机构投资者与资本市场研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目“机构投资者派系对基金期末业绩拉升行为的影响研究”（72162005）; 国家自然科学基金项目“承销商跟投制度的治理效应研究：基于科创板的经验证据”（72062016）; 国家自然科学基金项目“国家医保目录动态调整改革与企业创新：基于需求牵引的视角”（72462022）

Identifying the Governance Role of Large Institutional Investors in China: From the Earnings Management Perspective

Wu Xiao-hui¹, Yang Jing^1,2, Guo Xiao-dong³

1. Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005;
2. Guizhou Normal University, Guiyang 550025;
3. Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Received:2024-12-15 Revised:2025-03-24 Published:2026-01-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 大型机构投资者治理作用的甄别对上市公司治理作用的发挥以及资本市场的稳定具有重要意义。现有研究对中国大型机构投资者的关注较少。基于A股上市公司2004—2023年的数据考察大型机构投资者对公司盈余管理影响的研究结果显示,中国资本市场上的大型机构投资者加剧了公司的盈余管理,表现出“颗粒性”,产生“颗粒效应”。作用渠道检验结果表明,大型机构投资者通过在投资组合公司之间主导建立“合谋同盟”促进重点持股公司和重点持股行业非重点持股公司的盈余管理,加剧投资行业的信息不对称程度,以加厚信息壁垒、扭曲重点持股行业非重点持股公司的投资决策,帮助重点持股公司成为行业龙头,进而实现投资组合价值的最大化。相比之下,与大型机构投资者规模相当的较小独立机构群体通过投资前的选择、投资后“退出威胁”的威慑监督抑制了公司盈余管理。基于上述结论,监管部门应加强对大型机构投资者的监督,防范“合谋同盟”以及大型投资者带来的“颗粒效应”。同时,政策制定者在制定政策时应为较小的独立机构群体保留足够的生存和发展空间,使其对公司实际控制人和管理层以及大型机构投资者形成制衡。

关键词: 大型机构投资者, 合谋同盟, 信息壁垒, 退出威胁, 盈余管理

Abstract: Identifying the governance role of large institutional investors plays an important role in the governance role of listed companies and the stability of the capital market. The existing researches paid less attention to the large institutional investors in China. Based on the data from A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2023, this paper examines the impact of large institutional investors on corporate earnings management. The findings reveal that large institutional investors in China's capital market exacerbate corporate earnings management, exhibiting a“granularity”effect and generating a “granularity phenomenon”. The channeling effect test results indicate that large institutional investors facilitate earnings management among the key holding companies and the non-key holding companies within the key holding industries by leading the establishment of“collusive alliances”among portfolio firms. This exacerbates information asymmetry within investment industries, thickens information barriers, distorts investment decisions of non-key holding companies in key holding industries, and helps key holding companies become industry leaders, thereby maximizing portfolio value. In contrast, a group of smaller independent institutions with a scale comparable to that of large institutional investors mitigates corporate earnings management through pre-investment selection and post-investment “exit threat”deterrence supervision. Based on the above findings, the regulators should strengthen oversight of large institutional investors to prevent“collusive alliances”and the“granularity effect”brought by large investors. Meanwhile, policymakers should reserve sufficient room for survival and development for smaller independent institutions when formulating policies, enabling them to counterbalance corporate controlling shareholders, management, and large institutional investors.

Key words: large institutional investor, collusion alliance, information barrier, exit threat, earnings management

中图分类号:

F832.5

吴晓晖, 杨静, 郭晓冬. 中国大型机构投资者治理作用的甄别——基于盈余管理的视角[J]. 当代财经, 2026, 0(1): 114-126.

Wu Xiao-hui, Yang Jing, Guo Xiao-dong. Identifying the Governance Role of Large Institutional Investors in China: From the Earnings Management Perspective[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2026, 0(1): 114-126.

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