当代财经 ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8): 139-151.

• 现代会计 • 上一篇    下一篇

投服中心行权对企业杠杆操纵的影响研究

余怒涛, 苏慈, 王涵, 苗瑞晨   

  1. 云南财经大学 会计(审计)学院,云南 昆明 650221
  • 收稿日期:2024-10-17 修回日期:2025-05-05 出版日期:2025-08-15 发布日期:2025-09-03
  • 通讯作者: 苗瑞晨,云南财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理与公司财务研究,联系方式mrc912@126.com。
  • 作者简介:余怒涛,云南财经大学教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,主要从事公司治理与公司财务研究;苏慈,云南财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理与公司财务研究;王涵,云南财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理与审计研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目“供应链客户关系与上市公司大股东行为研究——基于股权质押视角”(72262034); 国家自然科学基金项目“大股东异质性、退出威胁与企业创新”(71862037)

Research on the Impact of China Security Investor Services Center Exercising Its Rights on Corporate Leverage Manipulation

Yu Nu-tao, Su Ci, Wang Han, Miao Rui-chen   

  1. Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China
  • Received:2024-10-17 Revised:2025-05-05 Online:2025-08-15 Published:2025-09-03

摘要: 投服中心是中国证监会批准设立并直接管理的公益机构,其以持股行权的方式督促上市公司规范运营。基于手工收集的投服中心行权数据,研究了投服中心行权对企业杠杆操纵的影响。研究发现,投服中心行权能抑制企业的杠杆操纵行为。机制检验表明,投服中心行权能提高企业对杠杆操纵风险的感知和强化外部治理,因而投服中心行权能抑制企业的杠杆操纵行为。异质性分析表明,投服中心以参加股东大会的方式行权更能抑制企业的杠杆操纵行为;投服中心行权对企业杠杆操纵行为的抑制作用在融资约束程度高的企业中更显著;在治理企业杠杆操纵上,投服中心与非控股大股东是协同关系;当控股股东在博弈中处于弱势地位时,企业的杠杆操纵行为更能得到抑制。经济后果检验表明,投服中心行权对企业杠杆操纵行为的抑制作用会降低企业的财务风险。为此,要进一步完善投服中心行权制度,加强对企业杠杆操纵行为的监管。

关键词: 投服中心行权, 杠杆操纵, 风险感知, 治理互动

Abstract: The Investor Service Center is a public welfare institution approved and directly managed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. It supervises and urges listed companies to operate in a standardized manner through shareholding and exercising its rights. Based on the hand-collected data on the exercise of China Security Investor Service Centers (CSISC), this paper investigates the impact of CSISC' exercising its rights on firms' leverage manipulation behaviors. Research has found that the exercise of its rights by CSISC can inhibit corporate leverage manipulation. The mechanism tests indicate that the exercise of its rights by CSISC can enhance corporate perception of leverage manipulation risks and strengthen external governance, thereby inhibiting corporate leverage manipulation. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that the exercise of its rights by CSISC through participation in shareholders' meetings can better inhibit corporate leverage manipulation. The inhibitory effect of CSISC's exercise of its rights on corporate leverage manipulation is more pronounced in enterprises with high levels of financing constraints. In governing corporate leverage manipulation, CSISC and the non-controlling major shareholders have a collaborative relationship; when the controlling shareholder is in a weak position in the game, corporate leverage manipulation can be better inhibited. The economic consequence test indicates that the inhibitory effect of CSISC's exercise of its rights on corporate leverage manipulation will reduce the financial risks of enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to further improve the right-exercise system of CSISC and strengthen the supervision of corporate leverage manipulation.

Key words: the exercise of its rights of China Security Investor Service Centers, leverage manipulation, risk perception, governance interactions

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