我国城市商业银行隐性担保测度及其演化研究

当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8): 59-71.

我国城市商业银行隐性担保测度及其演化研究

李一花^a,b, 祝婕^a

山东大学 a.经济学院 b.国家治理研究院,山东济南 250100

收稿日期:2024-01-15 修回日期:2024-03-23 出版日期:2024-08-15 发布日期:2024-08-02
通讯作者: 祝婕,山东大学博士研究生,主要从事地方债研究,联系方式kakula1412@163.com。
作者简介:李一花,山东大学教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事地方财政与地方债研究。
基金资助:
山东省社会科学基金重点项目“山东省重大风险防控研究”（19BCJ03）

A Research on the Measurement and Evolution of City Commercial Banks’ Implicit Guarantee in China

LI Yi-hua, ZHU Jie

Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China

Received:2024-01-15 Revised:2024-03-23 Online:2024-08-15 Published:2024-08-02

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 准确识别城市商业银行（以下简称“城商行”）的隐性担保是防控金融风险和提高资金配置效率的重要方面。基于我国城商行2014—2021年发行的同业存单数据,采用利差法和虚拟变量法测算城商行隐性担保水平,同时结合2019年包商银行破产事件分析城商行隐性担保水平的演化。结果表明,隐性担保使得我国城商行融资成本降低约六成;城商行隐性担保水平的分布与城商行主体评级负相关、与所在地的政府财力正相关,即主体评级越低、所在地的政府财力越高,隐性担保水平越高。机制分析发现,城商行隐性担保的形成机制主要取决于城商行自身风险、地方政府担保能力和担保意愿。包商银行破产事件发生后,城商行的隐性担保被明显削弱,且这一影响因政府担保意愿和担保能力以及城商行自身风险的不同而存在差异。因此,建议城商行加强风险预警体系建设、积极引进战略投资者和优化股权结构;建议政府部门优化城商行信用评级,强化第三方机构在信息披露中的作用。

关键词: 城商行, 同业存单, 利差, 隐性担保, 包商银行破产

Abstract: It is an important aspect of preventing and controlling financial risks and improving the efficiency of fund allocation to accurately identify the implicit guarantee of city commercial banks. Based on the data of inter-bank deposits issued by Chinese city commercial banks from 2014 to 2021, this paper uses the interest rate difference method and the dummy variable method to measure the implicit guarantee level of city commercial banks, and analyzes the evolution of the implicit guarantee of city commercial banks in combination with the bankruptcy event of Baoshang Bank in 2019. The results show that the implicit guarantee can reduce the financing cost of city commercial banks by about 60%. The distribution of the implicit guarantee of city commercial banks is negatively correlated with the rating of city commercial banks and positively correlated with the local government fiscal resources, that is, the lower the rating and the higher the local government fiscal resources, the higher the implicit guarantee level will be. The mechanism analysis reveals that the formation mechanism of implicit guarantee mainly depends on the risks of city commercial banks and the ability and willingness of local government to guarantee. After the bankruptcy event of Baoshang Bank, the implicit guarantee of city commercial banks has been significantly weakened, and this impact is different due to the government’s willingness and ability to guarantee and the different risks of city commercial banks. Therefore, it is suggested that city commercial banks should strengthen the construction of risk early warning system, actively introduce strategic investors and optimize equity structure. It is also suggested that the government departments should optimize the credit rating of city commercial banks and strengthen the role of the third-party institutions in information disclosure.

Key words: city commercial banks, interbank deposits, interest margin, implicit guarantee, bankruptcy of Baoshang Bank

中图分类号:

F830.91

李一花, 祝婕. 我国城市商业银行隐性担保测度及其演化研究[J]. 当代财经, 2024, 0(8): 59-71.

LI Yi-hua, ZHU Jie. A Research on the Measurement and Evolution of City Commercial Banks’ Implicit Guarantee in China[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2024, 0(8): 59-71.

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