当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8): 112-125.

• 产业与贸易 • 上一篇    下一篇

订货改善、默契合谋和最低零售价

王自力1, 万欣1,2   

  1. 1.江西财经大学 应用经济学院,江西 南昌 330013;
    2.江西省社会科学院 江西发展战略研究所,江西 南昌 330077
  • 收稿日期:2023-11-23 修回日期:2024-06-20 出版日期:2024-08-15 发布日期:2024-08-02
  • 通讯作者: 王自力,江西财经大学教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事政府规制与产业组织研究,联系方式13077958258@163.com。
  • 作者简介:万欣,江西财经大学博士研究生,江西省社会科学院助理研究员,主要从事区域产业经济与产业组织理论研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金地区项目“转售价格维持与最优订货”(72163012); 国家社会科学基金一般项目“激活革命老区乡村红色资源的产业融合创新路径研究”(23BGL313); 江西省社会科学基金项目“平台—厂商交叉锁定、线上市场高价及其反垄断治理”(24JL01)

Order Improvement, Tacit Collusion and Minimum Retail Price

WANG Zi-li1, WAN Xin1,2   

  1. 1. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013;
    2. Jiangxi Academy of Social Sciences, Nanchang 330077, China
  • Received:2023-11-23 Revised:2024-06-20 Online:2024-08-15 Published:2024-08-02

摘要: 识别和权衡最低零售价的效率功能和反竞争后果是当下反垄断理论与实践亟待解决的重要问题。研究发现,当市场需求存在不确定性、同时上游制造商与下游零售商存在零售信息不对称性时,竞争的制造商使用最低零售价存在三种效应:订货改善效应,即解决因市场需求不确定性产生的订货不足问题;默契合谋效应,即阻止合谋制造商利用信息不对称偏离合谋,提高默契合谋稳定性;零售信息效应,即使零售商无法利用零售信息优势调整零售价格。最低零售价对消费者福利的具体影响取决于上述效应的综合比较,市场需求不确定性越大、零售信息不对称程度越小或者产品替代性越弱,最低零售价越有可能改善消费者福利。反垄断执法机构可以根据最低零售价实施环境下的市场需求不确定性和零售信息不对称状态、低市场需求出现时零售价格是否变化以及制造商对待零售商降价的态度对最低零售价的实施动机进行分类识别。当制造商使用最低零售价可能兼具订货改善和默契合谋效应时,产品替代性越强,执法机构就越应该考虑制造商使用最低零售价的反竞争后果,实施相对更为严格的审查;反之,则更应该考虑其可能的效率功能,对制造商使用最低零售价采取相对更为宽容的态度。

关键词: 订货改善, 默契合谋, 最低零售价, 市场需求波动, 零售波动

Abstract: Identifying and weighing the efficiency functions and the anti-competitive consequences of the minimum Retail Price Maintenance(RPM)are important issues that need to be solved urgently in current antitrust theory and practice. The findings of this study show that when there is uncertainty in market demand and there is retail information asymmetry between the upstream manufacturers and the downstream retailers, there are three effects of competing manufacturers using RPM: the order improvement effect, which solves the problem of insufficient orders caused by market demand uncertainty; the tacit collusion effect, which prevents the colluding manufacturers from using information asymmetry to deviate from collusion and improves the stability of tacit collusion; the retail information effect, which prevents retailers from taking advantage of retail information to adjust retail prices. The specific impact of RPM on consumer welfare depends on the comprehensive comparison of the above effects. The greater the uncertainty in market demand, the smaller the degree of retail information asymmetry, or the weaker the product substitutability, the more likely it is that RPM will improve consumer welfare. The antitrust law enforcement agencies can classify and identify the motivations for RPM implementation according to the market demand uncertainty and the retail information asymmetry in the RPM implementation environment, whether retail prices change when low market demand occurs, and the attitude of manufacturers toward retailers’ price cuts. When a manufacturer may use RPM both for order improvement and for tacit collusion effects, the more substitutable the product, the more the law enforcement agencies should consider the anti-competitive consequences of the manufacturer’s use of RPM and implement relatively stricter scrutiny; otherwise, the law enforcement agencies should consider its possible efficiency features and take a relatively more tolerant stance on manufacturers’ use of RPM.

Key words: order improvement, tacit collusion, minimum retail price, market demand fluctuation, retail fluctuation

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