放松卖空管制与企业研发操纵——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验

当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 140-151.

放松卖空管制与企业研发操纵——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验

李学峰, 蔡新怡

南开大学金融学院,天津 300350

收稿日期:2023-12-16 修回日期:2024-03-08 出版日期:2024-07-15 发布日期:2024-08-27
通讯作者: 蔡新怡,南开大学博士研究生,主要从事公司财务与资本市场研究,联系方式xinyicai@mail.nankai.edu.cn。
作者简介:李学峰,南开大学高级研究员,教授,博士,主要从事资本市场与国家安全研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“中国契约型证券投资基金治理问题研究”（20FJYB016）

Releasing Short Selling Regulation and Corporate R&D Manipulation: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Margin Trading System

LI Xue-feng, CAI Xin-yi

Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China

Received:2023-12-16 Revised:2024-03-08 Online:2024-07-15 Published:2024-08-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 2010年中国证监会将卖空机制引入资本市场。那么,卖空机制是否会影响企业的研发操纵行为呢?以2007—2022年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,利用多期DID模型考察了卖空机制对企业研发操纵行为的影响。研究发现,卖空机制能有效抑制企业的研发操纵行为。机制分析发现,卖空机制能提高公司的治理水平和降低企业内外部之间的信息不对称程度,因而卖空机制可抑制企业的研发操纵行为。异质性分析发现,卖空机制对企业研发操纵的抑制作用在竞争程度高行业的企业、法治化水平低地区的企业、融资约束大的企业和内部控制质量高的企业中更显著。经济后果分析发现,卖空机制抑制了企业的研发操纵行为,因此卖空机制可提高企业的创新能力。为此,要进一步完善法律法规,加大对企业研发操纵行为的治理力度。

关键词: 卖空机制, 研发操纵, 治理水平, 信息不对称

Abstract: In 2010, the China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced the short selling mechanism into the capital market. So, will the short selling mechanism affect the R&D manipulation behavior of enterprises? Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2022 as the research objects, this paper makes use of a multi period DID model to examine the impact of short selling mechanism on corporate R&D manipulation behavior. The findings show that the short selling mechanism can effectively suppress the R&D manipulation behavior of enterprises. The mechanism analysis reveals that short selling mechanisms can improve the governance levels of companies and reduce the degree of information asymmetry between internal and external factors, thus the short selling mechanism can inhibit the R&D manipulation behaviors of enterprises. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the inhibitory effect of short selling mechanism on corporate R&D manipulation is more significant in highly competitive industries, regions with lower levels of rule of law, enterprises with greater financing constraints, and enterprises with higher internal quality control. The economic consequence analysis reveals that the short selling mechanism has suppressed the R&D manipulation behavior of enterprises, thus the short selling mechanism can improve the innovation ability of enterprises. To this end, it is necessary to further improve laws and regulations and enhance the governance of corporate R&D manipulation behaviors.

Key words: short-selling mechanism, R&D manipulation, governance level, information asymmetry

中图分类号:

F275.5

李学峰, 蔡新怡. 放松卖空管制与企业研发操纵——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验[J]. 当代财经, 2024, 0(7): 140-151.

LI Xue-feng, CAI Xin-yi. Releasing Short Selling Regulation and Corporate R&D Manipulation: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Margin Trading System[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2024, 0(7): 140-151.

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