当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3): 30-42.

• 公共经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

税收分成、财政激励与企业异地投资——基于增值税五五分成的准自然实验

李红霞, 张亚璟, 马艳   

  1. 首都经济贸易大学 财政税务学院,北京 100071
  • 收稿日期:2023-07-31 修回日期:2023-12-25 出版日期:2024-03-15 发布日期:2024-03-04
  • 通讯作者: 马艳,首都经济贸易大学博士研究生,主要从事财政理论与政策研究,联系方式aimme9879@163.com。
  • 作者简介:李红霞,首都经济贸易大学教授,博士生导师,经济学博士,主要从事财政理论与政策研究;张亚璟,首都经济贸易大学博士研究生,主要从事财政理论与政策研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“我国减税降费政策效果绩效评估与风险防范研究”(20BJY219); 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“新时代中期预算脆弱度分析与可持续路径选择研究”(18YJA790044); 北京市教委社科重点项目“北京市中期预算引入预算绩效改革问题研究”(SZ202010038021)

Tax Sharing, Fiscal Incentives and Nonlocal Investment of Enterprises: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on 50/50 VAT Sharing

LI Hong-xia, ZHANG Ya-jing, MA Yan   

  1. Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100071, China
  • Received:2023-07-31 Revised:2023-12-25 Online:2024-03-15 Published:2024-03-04

摘要: 财政激励作为调节政府间财政分配关系的重要手段,深刻影响着地方政府决策行为。税收分成改革呈现不同的财政激励效果,引发地方税收竞争并传导至企业,对区域经济协调发展有至关重要的影响。将2016年增值税五五分成改革作为财政激励的外生冲击变量,通过构建强度差分模型,实证检验税收分成改革带来的激励效应如何影响企业异地投资。研究表明:增值税分成比例提高会激励地方政府积极扶持本地企业留住税源,并抑制企业异地投资。进一步研究发现,无论是对高财政自给率地区还是低财政自给率地区,增值税分成比例变化均表现了强烈的抑制效应,且在低组别的抑制效应更大;地方政府更倾向于对直接控股的地方国有企业和异地投资比例较高的企业进行管控;改革带来的激励变化会促进企业信贷的获得和政府补助的提高。因此,建议提升流动税基的中央集中度,弱化地方政府对企业异地投资的干预动机;建立“赋权—控权”的财政激励机制,抑制地区间过度税收竞争及市场分割现象;推进地方政府从管理型向服务型政府转变,减少对企业异地投资的干预和控制。

关键词: 税收分成, 财政激励, 企业异地投资, 增值税五五分成

Abstract: Fiscal incentives, as an important means of regulating the distribution of finance among governments, have a profound impact on the decision-making behavior of local governments. The tax sharing reform presents different fiscal incentive effects, triggers local tax competition that transmits to enterprises, and has a crucial impact on the coordinated development of regional economy. Taking the 2016 VAT 50/50 sharing reform as an exogenous shock variable of fiscal incentives, this paper empirically test how the incentive effect brought by the tax sharing reform affect the nonlocal investment of the enterprises by constructing an intensity difference model. It is found that an increase in the VAT sharing ratio will incentivize local governments to actively support local firms in retaining tax sources and discourage firms from investing in other places. Further research shows that the changes in VAT sharing ratio exhibit strong inhibiting effects across regions with higher fiscal self-sufficiency rates or lower fiscal self-sufficiency rates, which is greater in the lower groups. Local governments are more inclined to control the local state-owned enterprises with direct control and the enterprises with a higher proportion of investment in other regions. The incentive changes brought about by the reform will promote the acquisition of corporate credit and the increase of government subsidies. Thus, it is recommended that the centralized concentration of the mobile tax base be increased to weaken the local governments’ incentive to intervene in enterprises’ nonlocal investments, that an“empowerment-control”fiscal incentive mechanism be established to curb excessive inter-regional tax competition and market segmentation, and that the transformation of the local government from a“management-type”to a“service-type”government be promoted to reduce the intervention in, and control of, enterprises’nonlocal investments.

Key words: tax sharing, financial incentives, nonlocal investment of enterprises, 50/50 VAT sharing

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