证券代表人诉讼制度的市场反应

当代财经 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 140-151.

证券代表人诉讼制度的市场反应

陈良银¹, 黄俊²

1.上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海 201620;
2.上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海 200433

收稿日期:2024-03-27 修回日期:2024-06-15 出版日期:2024-11-15 发布日期:2024-11-21
通讯作者: 黄俊,上海财经大学教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事财务会计和公司财务研究,联系方式huangjun@mail.shufe.edu.cn。
作者简介:陈良银,上海对外经贸大学讲师,博士,主要从事财务会计与公司治理研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“激励机制、人力资本与公司价值”（72072107）; 国家自然科学基金青年项目“数字政府建设与资本跨区域流动——基于企业异地投资的视角”（72302141）; 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目“大数据发展与会计信息契约功能研究”（22JJD790093）

The Market Reaction to the Security Representative Litigation System

CHEN Liang-yin¹, HUANG Jun²

1. Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620;
2. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2024-03-27 Revised:2024-06-15 Online:2024-11-15 Published:2024-11-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 保护中小投资者的权益一直是理论界和实务界关注的焦点。基于2020年7月31日施行的《最高人民法院关于证券纠纷代表人诉讼若干问题的规定》,研究了证券代表人诉讼制度引起的市场反应。研究表明,证券代表人诉讼制度会引起正面的市场反应。作用机制检验发现,证券代表人诉讼制度施行不但会使独立董事离职和发表非赞成意见的数量显著增加,而且还会使中小股东加强对公司的监督,因而证券代表人诉讼制度会产生正面的市场反应。异质性分析发现,在独立董事比例低、代理成本高和机构投资者持股比例低的公司中,证券代表人诉讼制度产生的正面的市场反应更显著。为此,要积极引导投资者利用证券代表人诉讼制度维护自身权益,监管部门要进一步强化投服中心对证券代表人诉讼制度的支撑作用。

关键词: 中小投资者保护, 证券代表人诉讼制度, 公司治理, 市场反应

Abstract: Based on the“Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Representative Litigation in Securities Disputes”implemented by the Supreme People's Court on July 31, 2020, this paper studies the market response to the securities representative litigation system. The findings show that the securities representative litigation system will generate positive market reactions. The mechanism test reveals that the implementation of the securities representative litigation system not only significantly increases the number of independent directors resigning and expressing dissenting opinions, but also strengthens the supervision of small and medium-sized shareholders over the company. Therefore, the securities representative litigation system will have a positive market response. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that in companies with lower proportion of independent directors, higher agency costs, and lower shareholding ratio of institutional investors, the positive market response generated by the securities representative litigation system is more significant. Therefore, it is necessary to actively guide investors to use the securities representative litigation system to safeguard their own rights and interests, and the regulatory authorities should further strengthen the support role of the investment service centers for the securities representative litigation system.

Key words: minority shareholder protection, security representative litigation system, corporate governance, market response

中图分类号:

F832

陈良银, 黄俊. 证券代表人诉讼制度的市场反应[J]. 当代财经, 2024, 0(11): 140-151.

CHEN Liang-yin, HUANG Jun. The Market Reaction to the Security Representative Litigation System[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2024, 0(11): 140-151.

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