转移支付分配如何影响地方基本公共服务供给—基于政府间财政竞争的视角

当代财经 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (12): 28-40.

转移支付分配如何影响地方基本公共服务供给—基于政府间财政竞争的视角

束磊¹, 梁倩²

1.上海商学院商务经济学院,上海 201400;
2.贵州财经大学大数据应用与经济学院,贵州贵阳 550025

收稿日期:2021-04-26 出版日期:2021-12-15 发布日期:2021-12-20
通讯作者: 梁倩,贵州财经大学副教授,经济学博士,主要从事财税理论与政策研究,联系方式7088782@qq.com。
作者简介:束磊,上海商学院讲师,经济学博士,主要从事财税理论与政策研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“中国的政府间事权与支出责任划分研究”（16ZDA065）; 上海高校市级重点课程建设项目“上海商学院《国际税收》课程建设”（沪教委高〔2020〕58号—449）

How Does the Transfer Payment Distribution Affect the Supply of Local Basic Public Services? From the Perspective of Intergovernmental Financial Competition

SHU Lei¹, LIANG Qian²

1. Shanghai Business School, Shanghai 201400;
2. Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Received:2021-04-26 Online:2021-12-15 Published:2021-12-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 转移支付是保障地方基本公共服务供给的重要制度安排。利用2003—2019年中国省级面板数据,实证分析了政府间财政竞争机制下,转移支付分配对地方基本公共服务供给产生的影响。研究发现,政府间转移支付分配与地方基本公共服务供给表现为显著的竞争性策略互动关系。竞争性地区分配的转移支付资金越多,本地政府越倾向于减少基本公共服务供给;这种竞争性的策略互动关系,抑制了转移支付对地方基本公共服务供给的激励保障作用。分转移支付类型来看,这种竞争性策略互动关系对地方基本公共服务供给的抑制作用在专项转移支付上表现更加突出;分地区来看,竞争性策略互动关系对地方基本公共服务供给的抑制作用在经济发达地区表现更加明显。因此,规范地区间财政竞争秩序,构建更加科学透明的转移支付资金分配制度,进一步优化转移支付资金分配结构,有利于发挥转移支付制度保障地方基本公共服务供给的激励作用。

关键词: 转移支付, 地方基本公共服务, 政府间财政竞争, 策略互动关系

Abstract: Fiscal transfer payments are the important institutional arrangements to ensure the supply of basic local public services. By making use of China’s provincial-level panel data from 2003 to 2019, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of transfer payment distribution on the supply of local basic public services under the inter-governmental fiscal competition mechanism. The findings show that there is a significant competitive strategic interactive relationship between the distribution of intergovernmental transfer payments and the supply of local basic public services. And the more transfer payment funds distributed in the competitive regions, the more local governments are inclined to reduce the supply of the basic public services. This kind of competitive strategic interactive relationship can inhibit the incentive and safeguarding effect of the transfer payments on the supply of local basic public services. In terms of transfer payment types, the inhibiting effect of the competitive strategic interactive relationship on the supply of local basic public services is more prominent in the special transfer payments. In terms of the regions, the inhibitory effect of the competitive strategic interactive relationship on the supply of local basic public services is more obvious in the economically developed regions. Therefore, standardizing the order of fiscal competition among the regions, constructing a more scientific and transparent transfer payment distribution mechanism, and further optimizing the distribution structure of transfer payment funds are conducive to the incentive role of transfer payment system in ensuring the supply of local basic public services.

Key words: transfer payments, local basic public services, inter-governmental fiscal competition, strategic interactive relationship

中图分类号:

F812.45

束磊, 梁倩. 转移支付分配如何影响地方基本公共服务供给—基于政府间财政竞争的视角[J]. 当代财经, 2021, 0(12): 28-40.

SHU Lei, LIANG Qian. How Does the Transfer Payment Distribution Affect the Supply of Local Basic Public Services? From the Perspective of Intergovernmental Financial Competition[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(12): 28-40.

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