关键词: 公司治理,经理人自利动机,费用粘性

Abstract: Taking as the samples China’s companies which are continuously listed from 2001 to 2012 and whose managers have self-interest motivations, this paper studies whether corporate governance mechanism can affect cost stickiness through restriction of the managers’ self-interest incentive. The results show that companies with higher corporate governance level can restrict managers’ self-interest incentives, resulting in a cost stickiness of lower level; while in companies with lower corporate governance level, the managers’ self-interest incentives is obvious and the cost stickiness is also at a higher level. Further study reveals that there is a significantly positive correlation between the level of corporate governance and corporate values. These conclusions have practical significance in strengthening corporate governance to alleviate the agency problem by restricting the managers’ self-interest incentive and in strengthening cost control so as to enhance the corporate values.

Key words: corporate governance; the self-interest motivation of managers; cost stickiness