Can the Central Environmental Protection Inspection Improve the Environmental Performance of Enterprises? Empirical Evidences from the Listed Industrial Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract: As an important means to urge the local governments to perform environmental protection duties and implement environmental policies, the Central Environmental Protection Inspection has a significant impact on the construction of ecological civilization in China. Taking the A-share listed industrial enterprises from 2012 to 2019 as samples, this paper employs the multi-period DID model to investigate the impact of the implementation of the central environmental inspection policies on the environmental performance of enterprises. The findings shows that: (1) the implementation of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection has significantly increased the enterprises’ environmental performance; (2) the Central Environmental Protection Inspection mainly improves the environmental performance of enterprises by strengthening the environmental governance of local governments and the environmental attention of the senior management teams; (3) good external environment, i.e., the level of urban green finance, the level of regional economic development, the analysts’ attention and the perfect internal corporate governance, can strengthen the positive impact of the Central Environmental Inspection on the environmental performance of enterprises; (4) the environmental governance effect of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection is different due to the nature of property rights and pollution degree of enterprises. Compared to state-owned enterprises, the private enterprises are more sensitive to the implementation of the Central Environmental Inspection policies, and the improvement of the enterprise environmental performance is more significant. While in the inside of the state-owned enterprises, the local state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to the Central Environmental Inspection policies than the central state-owned ones. Compared with the non-heavily polluting enterprises, the Central Environmental Inspection has a greater impact on the environmental performance of heavily polluting enterprises.

Key words: central environmental protection inspection, enterprise environmental performance, local environmental supervision, environmental attention of senior management team

CLC Number:

F275

ZHANG Rui, YE Yan-yan. Can the Central Environmental Protection Inspection Improve the Environmental Performance of Enterprises? Empirical Evidences from the Listed Industrial Enterprises[J]. Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2023, 0(6): 13-26.

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