Abstract: The court's compulsory approval of enterprise bankruptcy reorganization is actually a denial of the voluntary choice and negotiation value of bankruptcy reorganization by public power by virtue of the vague concept of social public interest, which increases the opportunity cost of creditors, forces most creditors to accept unexpected risks, and transfers the consequences of reorganization failure to creditors. Therefore, the enterprise bankruptcy reorganization legislation should balance the“social public interest”, the“protection of creditors' private rights”and the potential“opportunity cost”to ensure that their rights can be guaranteed through a fair and reasonable debt repayment rule and the repayment standard. The law should fully consider the risks and expected benefits of reorganization, as well as the time value and investment opportunities that creditors lost, and the characteristics of the creditor's industry. The liquidation rules and standards should be set in accordance with the principle of the balance of rights and responsibilities, rather than a general description of principles.

Key words: bankruptcy reorganization, mandatory approval, equilibrium of interests, fairness and efficiency, rule restatement