Abstract: The process of rural land transfer is essentially the game process of the redistribution of interests among various stakeholders in a specific scenario. Through a case analysis of the land transfer in G village in southern Jiangxi, it is found that such strategies as farmers’ interest demands relying on “legalization”, the game mode of collective “violence”, the signing of situational contracts and so on have constructed the forms of situational game in the process of rural land transfer. On the operation field of situational game, the practice logic of villagers’ benefit sharing is realized; but due to the lack of institutionalized game mechanism, the benefit distribution order of this kind of benefit sharing is rather unstable in reality, so the rural land transfer is prone to fall into the pattern of invalid equilibrium. In current exploring of the reform of rural land property rights system, we need to speed up the establishment of institutionalized benefit distribution mechanism and construct a game mechanism of “symmetrical equilibrium”.

Key words: rural land transfer; situational game; shared interests；the benefit distribution order; low institutionalized balance