农地确权和非正式规则如何影响农地流转租金

江西财经大学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (6): 88-97.

农地确权和非正式规则如何影响农地流转租金

李星光, 霍学喜

西北农林科技大学经济管理学院西部农村发展研究中心,陕西西安 712100

收稿日期:2021-06-23 修回日期:2021-09-27 出版日期:2021-11-25 发布日期:2021-11-23
通讯作者: 霍学喜,西北农林科技大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事农业产业经济、农村区域发展和农产品贸易与政策研究,联系方式xuexihuo@nwsuaf.ede.cn。
作者简介:李星光,西北农林科技大学博士研究生,主要从事农业经济理论与政策研究。
基金资助:
财政部和农业农村部国家现代农业产业技术体系资助项目“中国苹果产业经济研究”（CARS-28）

How Farmland Ownership Affirmation and Informal Rules Affect Farmland Transfer Rents

LI Xing-guang, HUO Xue-xi

Northwest Agriculture Forestry University, Xi’an 712100, China

Received:2021-06-23 Revised:2021-09-27 Online:2021-11-25 Published:2021-11-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在农地产权制度不完善的情境中,农地确权和非正式规则决定农地产权风险水平,进而影响农地流转租金。通过构建农地确权、非正式规则及其相互作用对流转租金影响的理论模型,并采用源自山东、陕西762户苹果种植户的微观调查数据进行实证检验。结果表明,农地确权、第三方参与提高流转租金,而农地交易双方互惠关系越密切降低流转租金,且农地确权强化农地交易双方互惠关系对流转租金的抑制作用;违约惩罚条款提高流转租金,降低非正式规则的作用,契约形成过程及有效期内第三方参与具有违约规制功能。

关键词: 农地流转租金, 农地确权, 非正式规则, 违约惩罚条款

Abstract: In the context of the imperfect systems of farmland property rights, farmland ownership affirmation and informal rules will determine the risk level of farmland property rights, and further affecting farmland transfer rents. Through establishing a theoretical model to display the impacts of farmland ownership affirmation, informal rules and their interactions on farmland transfer rents, this paper adopts the microscopic survey data of 762 apple growers from Shandong province and Shaanxi province to conduct an empirical examination. The results indicate that farmland ownership affirmation and third-party involvement could increase the rents of farmland transfer, but the closer reciprocal relationship of the farmland transacting parties could decrease farmland transfer rents, and farmland ownership affirmation could strengthen the inhibiting effect of the reciprocal relationship of transacting parties on farmland transfer rents. The punitive default clauses in farmland rental contracts could increase farmland transfer rents, but weaken the impact of informal rules on farmland transfer rents. The third-party involvement could have the function of default regulation in the formation process of farmland rental contracts and within the validity period of rental contracts.

Key words: farmland transfer rents, farmland ownership affirmation, informal rules, punitive default clauses

中图分类号:

F301.4

李星光, 霍学喜. 农地确权和非正式规则如何影响农地流转租金[J]. 江西财经大学学报, 2021, 0(6): 88-97.

LI Xing-guang, HUO Xue-xi. How Farmland Ownership Affirmation and Informal Rules Affect Farmland Transfer Rents[J]. Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2021, 0(6): 88-97.

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