江西财经大学学报 ›› 2014, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (04): 537-.

• • 上一篇    

家族控制、管理层持股与会计信息质量

林 波1,陈少华2,吴益兵2   

  1. (1. 厦门理工学院 商学院,福建 厦门 361024;2. 厦门大学 管理学院,福建 厦门 361005)
  • 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:林 波,厦门理工学院讲师,博士,主要从事财务会计事研究,联系方式blin@xmut.edu.cn;陈少华,厦门大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事财务会计与风险管理研究;吴益兵,厦门大学助教,博士,主要从事审计与内部控制研究。

Family Control, Managerial Ownership and Accounting Information Quality

LIN Bo1, CHEN Shao-hua2, WU Yi-bing2   

  1. (1. Xiamen University of Technology, Xiamen 361024; 2. Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China)
  • Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 我国家族企业股权公开化、社会化和管理职业化的趋势,使得家族企业的委托代理问题引起广泛的关注。管理层持股与会计信息披露作为委托代理问题的主要解决方案之一,一直以来都是学术研究的重要内容。我们以2007-2010年我国A股市场民营上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了家族与非家族上市公司会计信息质量的差异。研究发现,相比于非家族上市公司,家族上市公司具有较低的盈利质量和信息披露质量。进一步的检验还发现,管理层持股对家族企业会计信息质量能够起到强化作用。

关键词: 家族控制,管理层持股,会计信息质量

Abstract: With the trends of the equity openness and socialization and the managerial professionalization in China’s family business, the principal-agent problem in family business has aroused widespread concerns. Managerial ownership and accounting information, as the main solutions to the principal-agent problem, have become an important content in academic researches. Taking the private listed companies in China’s A-share market during 2007-2010 as the research samples, this paper empirically examines the differences of accounting information quality between family listed companies and non-family listed companies. The results indicate that compared to the non-family listed companies, the family listed companies have lower earning quality and information disclosure quality. Further examine reveals that managerial ownership can play a role of invigorating the accounting information quality of family firms.

Key words: family control; managerial ownership; accounting information quality