关键词: 企业避税,税收征管,零杠杆,债务融资政策

Abstract: Based on the financial data of A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2014, this paper empirically examines the reasons for the existence of zero-leverage phenomenon from the perspective of corporate tax avoidance. The findings show that similar to the international market, there exists zero-leverage in Chinese capital market. In addition, the higher the level of corporate tax avoidance, the higher the possibility of firms taking extreme debt financing decisions. However, the higher the level of tax collection and management, the lower the probability of zero-leverage will occur. Further analysis finds that tax collection and management can significantly inhibit the positive relationship between corporate tax avoidance and zero-leverage decisions. The above results are verified through the robustness test. The conclusions not only have reference significance to the investment decision of shareholders and creditors, but also provide empirical support for tax and other government agencies to play an effective role in the external governance of tax collection and management and optimizing business financing environment, which is more important.

Key words: enterprise tax avoidance; tax collection and management; zero-leverage; debt financing policy