江西财经大学学报 ›› 2019, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 147-.

• • 上一篇    

养老PPP服务质量监管三方演化博弈关系研究

岳向华a,林毓铭b   

  1. (暨南大学 a. 管理学院;b. 公共管理学院,广东 广州 510632)
  • 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:岳向华,暨南大学博士研究生,主要从事项目管理和社会保障研究,通讯作者联系方式460022688@qq.com;林毓铭,暨南大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事社会保障与养老保险研究。

Research on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Relationship of Pension PPP Service Quality Supervision

YUE Xiang-hua, LIN Yu-ming   

  1. (Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China)
  • Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 为了探索如何建立有效的监管机制使得养老产业PPP服务高质量发展,打破以往单一变量的研究,尝试多维度引入公众参与水平、声誉、政府补贴及惩罚等多个变量,构建“私人部门-第三方-政府部门”三者间的演化博弈模型。通过分析影响各博弈方策略选择与演化的因素,确立各方行为策略趋于稳定状态的条件,并用Matlab仿真了博弈结果中的“理想状态”。结果显示,在声誉、政府补贴和惩罚等因素的约束下, 当公众参与水平较高时,即便政府部门消极监管,第三方趋向于履行评估职责,私人部门也趋向于提高服务质量;当公众参与水平较低时,任何一方主体行为的演化趋势都与其他两方的策略选择紧密关联。若能建立声誉机制和惩罚机制,完善现行的公众参与机制和政府补贴机制,并将四者高度融合起来形成多维监管,有助于实现养老产业PPP服务高质量发展的“理想目标”。

关键词: 养老产业,PPP模式,质量监管,演化博弈,三方博弈

Abstract: In order to explore how to establish an effective supervision mechanism so as to make the PPP service of the pension industry develop with high quality, this paper breaks the previous studies with single variable and attempts to introduce multiple variables such as public participation level, reputation, government subsidies and punishments to establish an evolutionary game model among the three sides of private sector, third party and government department. Through analyzing the factors affecting the strategy selection of each side and the evolution, this paper establishes the conditions for the behavior strategies of all parties tending to stabilize and simulates the “ideal state” in the game results by means of Matlab. The results show that under the constraints of such factors as reputation, government subsidies and punishments, when the level of public participation is high, the third party tends to perform evaluation duties and the private sector tends to improve the quality of service even if the government departments are negatively regulated; however, when the level of public participation is low, the evolution trend of the behavior of any party is closely related to the strategy choices of the other two parties. It will help to achieve the “ideal goal” of the high-quality development of PPP services in the pension industry if we can establish a reputation mechanism and a punishment mechanism, improve the current public participation mechanism and government subsidy mechanism, and combine the four to form a multi-dimensional supervision.

Key words: pension industry; PPP mode; quality supervision; evolutionary game; tripartite game