Abstract: In China, independent directors can serve up to two consecutive tenures, and there is a common phenomenon of staggered tenure for independent directors in listed companies, where there are both the first tenure and the second tenure independent directors in the company. It is worth exploring the impact of this staggered tenure on the effectiveness of independent directors in fulfilling their duties. Taking 12390 observation values of independent directors-companies-year, who have raised objections in A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2022, as the research sample, this study empirically examines the impact of staggered tenure of independent directors on their dissenting behaviors. The research results indicate that the staggered tenure of independent directors has both informational and supervisory effects, which increases their probability and quantity of expressing dissenting opinions. The staggered tenure of independent directors has an information effect on the first tenure independent directors. When there are more multiple positions, the tenure of CEO and the first tenure independent directors are not synchronized, the information effect of staggered tenure of independent directors is greater. The staggered tenure of independent directors has a supervisory effect on the second tenure independent directors. When there are rookie independent directors, fewer multiple positions or the tenure of CEO and the second tenure of independent directors are synchronized, the supervisory effect of the staggered tenure of independent directors is stronger. In addition, the staggered tenure of independent directors increases the possibility of independent directors expressing dissenting opinions on different proposals to different tenure independent directors. It can be seen that forming a personnel structure with staggered tenure of independent directors in a company can enhance the effectiveness of independent directors’ performance. Therefore, in the context of the comprehensive registration system reform, the Stock Exchanges and investors should pay more attention to the tenure structure of independent directors when evaluating the quality of company information disclosure. This not only helps stock exchanges reduce audit inquiry costs, improve audit efficiency and quality, but also helps investors identify high-quality information and make more accurate investment decisions.

Key words: the staggered tenure of independent directors, rookie independent directors, multiple positions of independent directors, the tenure of CEO and independent directors, performance effectiveness