Flexible Tax Collection and Management and Firms’ Social Security Compliance: An Analysis Based on the Tax Credit Rating System

Abstract

Abstract: Currently, the income and expenditure pressure on China’s social security fund is increasing, an important way to fill the social security fund gap is to improve enterprise social security payment compliance. Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021, this paper takes the implementation of the tax credit rating system as a quasi natural experiment and conducts an empirical investigation of the impact of flexible tax collection and management on enterprise social security payment compliance. The findings show that the implementation of the tax credit rating system has significantly improved the social security payment compliance of firms, i.e., the flexible tax collection and management can promote the compliant payment of social security payment of enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the implementation of the tax credit rating system will increase the media attention of firms, thereby improving the social security payment compliance of firms. Besides, the facilitating effect of flexible tax collection and management on firms’ social security payment compliance is mainly found in regions where the tax authorities are fully responsible for collecting social security payment, as well as in the non-state-owned firms, the large-scale firms and the capital-intensive firms. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen the construction of tax credit system to create a good institutional environment for the improvement of firms’ social security payment compliance, to strengthen the supervision of firms’ social security payment evasion and standardize their social security payment behaviors, to give full play to the information, collection and management advantages of the tax authorities to promote the linked governance of taxes and fees, and to continue to push forward the policy of lowering social security payments and focus on the social security payment burdens of different types of firms.

Key words: flexible tax collection and management, tax credit rating system, enterprise social security contribution, payment compliance, reputation mechanism

CLC Number:

F812.42

YIN Ling, WU Yi-ping, ZENG Qi. Flexible Tax Collection and Management and Firms’ Social Security Compliance: An Analysis Based on the Tax Credit Rating System[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2024, 0(8): 45-58.

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