Abstract: Based on the manually collected and organized data on the changes in management power in the amendment announcements of the charters of listed companies from 2010 to 2019, this paper adopts a double difference method to test the impact of management power sinking based on the autonomy of the company’s charter on the executive compensation. The findings show that after the management power sinking, both the executive compensation and the excess compensation are significantly increased. Specifically, when the management power sinks, the increase in executive compensation and excess compensation is mainly reflected in a significant increase in scale compensation (rather than performance-based compensation), while the sensitivity of the company’s compensation performance significantly decreases. These empirical evidences support the management power theory. When the management power sinks, the company’s on-the-job consumption increases and the internal and external salary gap widens, but the company’s future business performance and market value have not significantly improved. Therefore, the decentralization of management power according to the autonomy of the company’s charter may lead to efficiency losses in the executive compensation incentives. The internal and external supervision mechanisms of the company, as well as the shareholding of the management, have a restraining effect on the positive correlation between the sinking of the management power and the executive compensation. Based on the above research conclusions, when companies modify their charters to authorize the management, they should pay attention to the potential rent-seeking behaviors of the executives, and achieve appropriate authorization and effective supervision.

Key words: charter autonomy, managerial power delegation, executive compensation, excess compensation, efficiency loss