Abstract: In recent years, the asset divestment behavior of newly appointed CEOs has become increasingly common. Based on the data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2021, this study empirically tests the relationship between CEO succession sources and asset divestitures. The findings show that the succeeded CEO from external tends to divest assets. The analysis of the impact mechanism reveals that due to being faced with the more stringent internal and external legitimacy pressures, the succeeded CEO from external needs to adopt the strategies of transmitting signals to the outside and maintaining the internal relationships to establish legitimacy. Therefore, the succeeded CEO from external will divest assets to meet the funding needs for implementing the strategic actions. The results of the heterogeneity analysis reveal that the higher the CEO’s personal risk goals and the higher the company’s economic benefits, the more likely the external successors of CEO is to engage in asset divestment. The new CEOs from non family members or from the external other than family members are more inclined to divest assets. The results of the economic consequence analysis reveal that the asset divestment behavior of the external successors of CEO can improve the short-term performance of the enterprises. To this end, the newly appointed CEO should actively establish legitimacy, make reasonable choices for the company’s resources allocation during asset divestment; the enterprises should promote the coordination and integration between the new CEOs and other executive members; and the external stakeholders need to strengthen their understanding and supervision of the new CEOs and the operation of the enterprises.

Key words: asset divestment, source of CEO succession, legitimacy status