Abstract: In the context of equity pledge, it is a topic worth paying attention to whether the controlling shareholder enhances the interaction of the network platform in order to alleviate the risks of control transfer. Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2020, this paper conducts an empirical study. The findings show that, after the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders, the response richness and response timeliness of the companies on“Easy Interaction”and“Shanghai Stock Exchange e Interaction”improve significantly, i.e., the equity pledge of controlling shareholders has a positive impact on the interaction of online platforms.When the controlling right transfer has higher risks, larger scale of retail investors and lower visibility, the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders will have a greater impact on the interaction of the online platform. Further study shows that irrelevant responses of the listed companies decrease after the controlling shareholders’equity pledging. The behavior of the listed companies to strengthen the interaction of the online platforms has reduced share crash risks and share price fluctuation risks, and also alleviated asset mispricing, which is conductive to the promotion of the capital market stability and the improvement of market information efficiency. Therefore, in the era of increasingly convenient“voicing”of investors, the market value management ideas of listed companies should be changed from the traditional “information supply”to the“information demand”. The controlling shareholders should pay more attention to the improvement of the interaction of online platforms from the perspective of corporate long-term interests, and conduct market value management in the way of considering both themselves and other stakeholders simultaneously.

Key words: shares pledge of controlling shareholders, online platform interaction, information processing cost, market value management, risk of control right transfer