“Structural”Deleveraging and Corporate Asset Allocation: De-Realization to Virtuality or De-Virtuality to Realization

Abstract

Abstract: Taking China's non-financial A-share state-owned listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as samples, this paper empirically studies the impact of structurally deleveraging policy on corporate asset allocation with the double difference analysis method. The results show that the deleveraging policy can significantly weaken the financial asset allocation of the enterprises and curb the fixed asset investment of the over-indebted enterprises, but it has no significant impact on their R&D investments. The deleveraging policy has also significantly promoted the entity investment of the normally debt-laden enterprises. The overlaying of the fiscal policy and the structural deleveraging policy can strengthen the entity investment of the enterprises, and the overlaying effect of the tax reduction and exemption policies for the high-tech enterprises is better than that of the government subsidies policies.

Key words: deleveraging, real economy investment, financial assets, fiscal policy

CLC Number:

F275.1

DOU Wei. “Structural”Deleveraging and Corporate Asset Allocation: De-Realization to Virtuality or De-Virtuality to Realization[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(11): 125-137.

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