Abstract: The classified reform of the mixed ownership is one of the important reform strategies in China’s state-owned enterprises. Taking the state-owned listing companies during the period of 2003-2018 as research objectives, this paper empirically tests the impact of the classified reform of mixed-ownership on capital allocation efficiency. The results show that, in the“fully competitive”state-owned enterprises（SOEs）, the mixed equity restriction can significantly restrain over-investment and improve capital allocation efficiency, while in the SOEs belonging to the“important industry category”, this effect is not significant. The results of further study show that in the state-owned enterprises in the“fully competitive category”, compared with the shareholders of other nature, private shareholders can play a more significant role in the restriction of over-investment, and can better improve capital allocation efficiency. Compared with SOEs in the“resource monopoly category”, the mixed equity restriction of SOEs in the“general competitive category” can significantly restrain over-investment and improve capital allocation efficiency.

Key words: classified reform of mixed-ownership, mixed equity restriction ratio, capital allocation efficiency