Abstract: From the perspective of information asymmetry, taking the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2015 as samples, this paper conducts an empirical test on the relationship between investors’ investigation and the effectiveness of top executive compensation contracts from the two aspects, i.e., the sensitivity between compensation and performance and the stickiness of compensation, then it further explores the impact of corporate equity structure on the relationship between the two. The results show that the firms with greater intensity of investors’ investigation would have higher compensation-performance sensitivity and lower stickiness of compensation. This kind of impact is more notable in the companies without absolutely controlling stockholders. Further test finds out that investors’ investigation will act on the top executive compensation contracts through improving the quality of financial reports. In addition, compared with the buy-side institutions, the investigation intensity of the sell-side institutions has a more significant impact on the effectiveness of top executive compensation contracts.

Key words: investors’ investigation; top executive compensation contract; sensitivity between compensation and performance; compensation sticky; equity structure