Abstract: In the online financing crowd-funding market, the consumers are faced with greater risks when selecting investment projects due to the asymmetry information between the project sponsors and the consumers. While the crowd-funding platform as the intermediary can avoid such problems effectively with its punishment effects under the sponsor supervision mechanism. This paper employs the evolutionary game theory to analyze the interactive mechanism between the crowd-funding platform with bounded rationality and the project sponsors’ strategic selection in the internet crowd-funding. The findings are as follows: when the platform and the sponsors’ incentive from outside reputation are not taken into consideration, the heavier the supervision punishment by the crowd-funding, the greater the possibility that the sponsors’ strategic evolution will tend to be revealing the truth; otherwise, the greater the sponsors’ deceitful degree, the greater the possibility that the crowd-funding strategic evolution will tend to be the supervision strategy; while the safety of the consumers’ funds will be the responsibility of the platform. Therefore, effective implementation of the supervision and application of the punishment strategy of different degrees can regulate effectively the behaviors of concealing the product information to deceive consumers by the project sponsors, lead the sponsors to reveal the true projects, reduce the adverse selection resulted from asymmetric information, and raise the consumers’ enthusiasm to participate the crowd-funding.

Key words: internet crowd-funding; adverse selection; evolutionary game; replicator dynamics equation