Abstract: Based on the annual data of China’s listed companies from 2005 to 2015, this paper studies the impact of financial development on the deleveraging of the listed companies. The results show that, firstly, the higher the level of financial development, the greater the extent of corporate deleveraging. And this kind of function mechanism has path dependence; the lower the initial leverage rate, the more motivated the listed companies to repay all their debts to reserve financial flexibilities. Secondly, when the level of financial development is lower, the companies will increase the proportion of cash holdings in the course of deleveraging. But with the development of regional finance, the state-owned listed companies are more likely to choose to pay off their debts to deleverage, while non-state-owned companies would mainly use their internal retained earnings to deleverage. Thirdly, the regulatory effect of the panel data model shows that financial development has a greater impact on the deleveraging of state-owned companies. The soft budget constraint has weakened the effect of financial development on the leverage adjustment of listed companies, but this effect is not significant in the sub-sample group of non-state-owned companies and the companies with flexible financial reserves. Therefore, the most fundamental policy lies in promoting the supply side reform continuously, getting rid of the market-planning dual-track system, reducing the institutional barriers, while at the same time creating healthy environment for the financial development, optimizing the corporate financing structures, developing the capital markets vigorously, and increasing the proportion of direct finance.

Key words: financial development; financial flexibility; state-owned property; listed companies; corporate deleveraging