Abstract: In recent years, the promotion of the PPP cooperation between government and social capital in China’s infrastructure sector has received extensive attention from the academic circles. By making use of the World Bank data, this paper conducts a theoretical and empirical study of the relationship between the level of government accounting information disclosure, the degree of official promotion incentives and the PPP mode chosen by local governments. The research results show that the level of government accounting information disclosure has played a role in promoting local governments to choose PPP mode and that to improve the level of government accounting information disclosure will reduce the information asymmetry between local governments and social capital, in this way the PPP cooperation will be promoted. In addition, the degree of official promotion incentives is the channel through which the government accounting information disclosure can act on PPP cooperation. In order to promote the rapid and healthy development of the PPP mode, it is necessary to promote the transparency of government accounting information at different levels and revise the assessment mechanism for officials’ promotion that is traditionally based on “GDP Championships”.

Key words: government accounting information disclosure; official promotion incentives; PPP mode