Abstract: With the increasing degree of openness of the capital markets, the vitality of the corporate control market is gradually stimulated and released, and the threat of listed companies being taken over is becoming more and more serious. As an important tool to maintain the interests of the company’s stakeholders, the interlaced board terms can reduce the risks to the stakeholders after the company is taken over. In this context, the impact of the interlaced board terms on the investment of listed companies is empirically tested from the perspective of interlaced board terms. The findings show that the setting up of the interlaced board terms by the listed companies can effectively alleviate the under-investment, and in the case of lower equity concentration and large board size, the mitigation effect of the interlaced board clauses on under-investment is more obvious; in the case of management holdings, the interlaced board terms are more conducive to curbing excessive investment.

Key words: anti-acquisition clause; interlaced board terms; over-investment; under-investment