Abstract: From the perspective of CPA’s job-hopping, this paper explores the potential incentives of the phenomenon of changing the firm while keeping the same CPA due to the clients following their signed CPAs. It analyzes the motive of this peculiar behavior from such angles as customer resource controlling, interpersonal relationship driving and audit opinion demanding, as well as the special incremental information and the ultra-instrumental relationship this behavior carries. Then, by referring to the rules about human reciprocity in the human relation theory, it dissects the weighing and selection of the human feeling compensation mechanism behind the behavior of changing the firm while keeping the same CPA, as well as its impacts on the audit quality, audit opinion and audit pricing. Finally, this paper puts forward some proposals to help the improvement of the regulatory policy on the individual practical behavior of the signed CPAs.

Key words: CPA’s job-hopping; motivation of job-hopping; economics result